This article explores the relationship between people and nation by focusing on the Greek case, which has attracted considerable political and media attention throughout the last few years. It traces the ways in which populism and nationalism have been related within Greek political culture diachronically, inclusive of the current crisis conjuncture. We follow this trajectory from the 1940s and the Greek Civil War up until today in order to capture the unexpectedly dynamic and ambivalent relationship between the two and account for its multiple mutations. The conclusions drawn from this country-specific exploration are expected to have wider implications for populism research internationally.
Introduction
The aim of this paper is to explore aspects of the relationship between populism and nationalism, which are conceived here as distinct types of discourses, as different (though not incompatible) ways in which collective identities are constructed and enacted. By focusing on this ambiguous and multifaceted relationship, we purport to shed light both on theoretical issues regarding these phenomena and on an empirical case that we consider particularly important. Indeed, our case, democratic Greece, has already been recognised as a "paradigmatic" one by scholars who study populism. This is mainly due to the persistent and at times decisive presence of populist actors in the Greek political scene. In Takis Pappas' words, "the Greek case offers near laboratory conditions for studying all possible facets and successive phases of populist development" (Pappas 2014, 6 ).
To be sure, populism has been a key-factor in understanding socio-political dynamics from the restoration of democracy in Greece in 1974 onwards, while its presence was already felt by the early 1960s. Arguably, a quasi-spontaneous populist dynamiclinked to the liberalisation of the life-style of popular strata and an upward mobility triggering high expectations -was only temporarily interrupted by the military Junta between 1967 and 1974 (Pantazopoulos 2001, 89-133) . Henceforth, the populist Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) with its charismatic leader, Andreas Papandreou, and a loyal and rapidly expanding electoral base, would define political confrontation and democratic stakes, both in opposition (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) and also in power (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (Lyrintzis 1987; Spourdalakis 1988 ). PASOK's populism gradually faded after the early 1990s, to give way to a "modernising consensus" (Lyrintzis 2005 ), but new players soon came to the fore. These included Archbishop Christodoulos, a rare case of a religious populist leader (Stavrakakis 2004) , the populist extreme-right party Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS) (Tsiras 2012) , the nationalist-populist Independent Greeks (ANEL) (Pappas & Aslanidis 2015, 192-193) , and the Coalition of Radical Left (SYRIZA), the major governing party since January 2015 (Katsambekis 2016b) .
1 Populism has been a significant force also within Greek civil society and social movements. The most important recent such example is the one of the "aganaktismenoi" (or "movement of the squares"), which erupted in the summer of 2011, following similar mobilisations in Spain (Katsambekis 2014a; Prentoulis & Thomassen 2014) .
In this context, it does not come as a surprise that populism has been one of the key themes that preoccupied Greece's social-scientific community already from the late 1970s and 1980s, with numerous articles and books being published and relevant conferences and public discussions being organized in university departments and other fora (Mouzelis 1978 (Mouzelis , 1985 Lyrintzis 1987; Mouzelis, Lipowatz & Spourdalakis 1989; Charalambis 1989; Elefantis 1992; Spourdalakis & Lyrintzis 1993) . One of the most prominent themes that developed within Greek populism research out of PASOK's hegemony, was that of its so-called national-populism or nationalist populism, especially developed by Andreas Pantazopoulos (2001) . Drawing his theoretical inspiration from the French political philosopher Pierre-André Taguieff, Pantazopoulos has at times suggested that (all) populism can only be nationalpopulism, which means that populism cannot exist without a close linkage or even identification with some kind of nationalism.
Pantazopoulos first applied this perspective to Andreas Papandreou's PASOK and then to the case of SYRIZA (Pantazopoulos 2001; 2013; . Similar arguments had been advanced by other Greek scholars, like Nikiforos Diamandouros, who saw populism -irrespective of its left-right placement -as a defining characteristic of the so-called "underdog culture", which was rooted in backwardoriented and defensive reactions against progress, in nationalism and anti-Westernism (Diamandouros 1994) . Quite interestingly, within the recent years of crisis and austerity the discussion around national-populism [εθνικολαϊκισμός] has left the academic sphere to acquire a prominent position in op-eds and commentaries in newspapers, while it has also been appropriated by a series of mainstream politicians in their effort to smear political opponents as "populist" and "nationalist".
Given its populist tradition(s) and the relevant debates generated -in which nation and people are often intertwined -we believe that the study of the Greek case can add important insights and findings to the broader international discussion around the relationship between populism and nationalism, which has only recently started to develop as a distinct research agenda (see De Cleen 2016) . In what follows, we start with a brief overview of the discussion, theorising the main concepts that we use in our analysis: how has populism been related to nationalism? Is it possible to conceptually distinguish the one from the other and how? We then move on to investigate genealogically the particularities of the Greek case starting from the post-WWII situation and concluding with the current SYRIZA-ANEL coalition. How has the "nation" been related to "the people" in Greece's historical trajectory? What could be the theoretical implications of the different articulations observed?
Concluding this paper, we critically reflect on the historical experience of the articulation(s) of populism and nationalism in the Greek case, stressing their heterogeneity and variability, as well as the implications they might have for the investigation of relationships between populism and nationalism in broader contexts.
Populism and nationalism
A cursory glance at the existing literature on populism would suffice for anyone to realise that populism has often been linked to nationalism in various historical instances (Ionescu & Gellner 1969; Meny & Surel 2002; Panizza 2005; Mudde & Kaltwasser 2012; de la Torre 2015) . The populist leaders of Latin America in the 1940s and 1950s had strong nationalist characteristics, while the same applies to some among the more recent populists of the so-called "pink tide", like Hugo Chávez, who are positioned on the left, but developed distinctive nationalist narratives (Philip & Panizza 2011; ). Europe's populist extreme-right trend after the late 1980s is also inconceivable without its pronounced nationalist/nativist ideological traits (Mudde 2007) . Lastly, even parties considered to belong to the contemporary European left have drawn on nationalist narratives; maybe the most typical example here is the Irish Sin Fein (March 2011, 122) . In this context, it should not come as a surprise that already from the late-1960s scholars have hypothesised that populism and nationalism are somehow necessarily related (e.g. Stewart 1969, 183) .
Highlighting such historical links between populism and nationalism is a rather easy task. What is crucial for political research is to determine what exactly these links mean. Do they mean that populism is necessarily linked and even reduced to nationalism, or is one dealing with a contingent, context-dependent articulation between the two? Obviously, the fact that populism as a notion appears particularly vague and malleable, does not make things easier. Moreover, nationalism itself, albeit constituting one of the richest research topics in the social sciences, remains quite vague and contested as well (especially when we start discussing variations of nationalism: ethnic, civic, etc.). To be sure, not all populisms are the same, nor do they produce the same results; notice, for example, the recent distinction between inclusionary and exclusionary populism(s) (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013). The same applies to nationalism(s); the operation of the "nation" in anti-colonialism, for example, is not identical with its far right articulations. Nevertheless, in addition to a priori attributing some sort of necessity to an "essential" linkage between populism and nationalism, some scholars also seem to take for granted a "universal" meaning of nationalism, premised on normative assumptions that regard it as necessarily dangerous, regressive and antidemocratic (e.g. Pantazopoulos 2016a; Taggart 2000, 96-97; Lukacs 2005, 65-66, 72) . As a result of the assumed reductionist relationship between populism and nationalism, the normative rejection of national identification also leads to an unconditional rejection of populism as well.
How can one avoid such a normative bias that could forestall a rigorous discussion of the issues in question? First, we need to stress that we understand both populism and nationalism as types of discourse. As particular ways of understanding and interpreting social reality and political stakes by interpellating social subjects and calling them to take action -whether that means calling the "people" to tear down an unpopular "establishment" and implement their democratic will, or calling upon the "nation" to defend the homeland against external and/or internal enemies. We do not claim that this is the only way to conceive these two notions. However, by associating this research with the broad and well-tested field of discourse analysis, as exemplified by the so-called "Essex School", we can make use of the fruitful methodological, theoretical and analytical insights produced by discourse theorists researching both populism and (admittedly less) nationalism (see Panizza 2005; Norval 1996) .
In this context, and following the work of discourse-oriented scholars (Laclau 2005; Stavrakakis 2004; Panizza 2005) , we define populism as a particular type of discourse which adopts a central reference to "the people" (or other equivalent signifiers: the "non-privileged", the "underdog", etc.) against a perceived power bloc, usually denounced as "the establishment" or "the elite". The particularity of populism lies in the fact that it creates equivalential links between subjects and demands drawing on their common grievances and frustrations, while channelling those feelings against a common political opponent (Katsambekis 2016c).
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Just as populism performatively ascribes to "the people" a protagonist position, making it the nodal point of its strategy, the primary function of nationalist discourse is to construct the "nation" (Sutherland 2005, 186) . This process is closely articulated with claims to defend its territory, sovereignty, interests, history and heritage, against anyone that threatens it. Thus, the crucial difference with populism does not only lie in the fact that the two discourses interpellate distinct (although historically closely related) collective subjects, but also in the fact that the very operation of constructing them follows different logics. While populism refers to an antagonism between "the people" as a potential social majority against an unresponsive or threatening elite at the top of socio-political hierarchy, nationalism refers to the "nation" as an (imagined) community of belonging and shared fate, opposed to external or internal enemies that threaten its unity, integrity and well-being (Anderson 2006) . It is in this sense that researchers have formulated a useful distinction between the down/up antagonistic logic of populism and the in/out (member/non-member) opposition of nationalism (De Cleen 2016, 72-73; Dyrberg 2003) . Lastly, it is crucial to stress that the "nation" of nationalist discourse is constructed by asserting its difference (or enmity) towards other nations; by contrast, "the people" of populism is always constructed through its opposition to a given "establishment" or "elite", and not against other "people".
Although our theoretical argument here is necessarily brief, we think it suffices to make it clear that populism and nationalism constitute different discursive modes of constructing collective subjects/identities, and they thus denote different analytical categories. Although historical articulations between them exist and have been documented in the literature, we should be careful not to conflate the two notions or to collapse one onto the other. Such a gesture would undermine the theoretical status and explanatory value of the concepts of both populism and nationalism, thus rendering impossible a rigorous account of the existing articulations of the phenomena to which they allude. Following the tradition of discourse theory, we suggest that it is through tracing the historical conditions of possibility behind hegemonic discourses within broader socio-political contexts, that we can further illuminate the specificity and importance of ideological phenomena. Let us then move on to examine these articulations in the Greek case.
Post-war Greece: the "nation" vs. "the people"? It is rather risky to suggest that post-war Greece (1945 Greece ( -1967 witnessed populist phenomena. The relevant research has very rarely used the term "populism" to explain aspects of Greece's social and political life during the period in question (Papadimitriou 2006) . One thing seems to be certain, though: the Greece that rose from the ashes of WWII (1940 WWII ( -1945 and the Greek Civil War (1945) (1946) (1947) (1948) (1949) , was a country defined by a rather peculiar yet extremely revealing juxtaposition. Paradoxical as it may seem, the official discourse of the ruling (right-wing) camp seemed to juxtapose the "nation" to "the people".
This dominant discourse was built around the ideology of ethnikofrosini (nationalmindedness), a state-ideology that primarily targeted the defeated left-wing camp. To be sure, Greece was far from exceptional in articulating such a state ideology. Ethnikofrosini was an expression of post-war anticommunism "as it developed in the USA and Western Europe; therefore, it was shaped by both national and transnational currents. In this respect, anti-communism was articulated with Greek nationalism" (Lialiouti 2015, 4) . Leftists were thus considered second-order citizens, largely excluded from the national community, portrayed as "enemies of the nation", "Slavs", "traitors," or common "bandits", suspected of undermining national institutions like family and religion, threatening social order or even the very territorial integrity of the country (Voglis 2002; Panourgia 2009; Papadimitriou 2006) . The "winners" of the Civil War claimed an absolute monopoly on the nation and thus demanded from those they considered "suspicious" to publicly declare their compliance with the same values and ideology as theirs, denouncing communism and the Left. Otherwise, they were considered as aliens to be eradicated, as "enemies within". In practice, the "monopoly of the nation" was translated into policies that had a very tangible impact on the lives of those persecuted. As stressed by Polymeris Voglis, during the Civil War, political repression against leftists culminated in political exclusion: "individuals were deprived of their civil rights because of their political beliefs, [...] leftists, and even their relatives, were deported or imprisoned, were fired from their jobs, had their property confiscated, or were deprived of their Greek nationality," in what was presented by the state as a campaign defending the nation (Voglis 2002, 63-64) . Part of this campaign, which continued after the end of the civil war, was also the so-called "rehabilitation" of communists in camps like the ones of Makronisos, where alleged leftists ("misguided communists") were severely tortured until considered "redoctrinated patriots" (ibid., 100-105).
On the other side, those participating in the resistance during the axis occupation through the ranks of the National Liberation Front (EAM) (which was affiliated to the Communist Party, KKE), had formulated their claim to the national community in terms of laocratia (rule by the people), emphasizing forms of self-rule and collective life that went beyond the Marxist-Leninist tradition, reflecting a Popular Front orientation as expressed in the 7th Congress of the Communist International (see Eley 2002, 264-265) . It was through the "people's kratos", the power of workers and peasants, that a "new Greece" would be born, with the popular masses now free from economic and political oppression (Skalidakis 2014) . As formulated in 1943, laocratia "was the power of the working people", that would resolve "the vital problems of the country according to the interest of the people". "The people", within this context, were described as a broad and pluralist coalition, one of "workers, peasants, manufacturers, private entrepreneurs, public servants, intelligentsia, soldiers, youth, national minorities", comprising a national majority that recognized "only one enemy, the reactionary oppressing big bourgeoisie" (ibid.). In this way, EAM's discourse embraced all anti-fascist and progressive elements of the Greek society, calling upon the people to join the fight for national liberation. But the nationalism it articulated was of a political kind (predominantly civic, not ethnic), one that stressed popular/political participation and anti-fascist struggle and did not endorse exclusions in terms of ethnic belonging (see Dimitriou 2014) .
The resulting divide involved a paradoxical tension between the "nation" and "the people", nationalism and populism. If, on the one hand, the right-wing state established after the civil war was an exclusionary "a-popular" state, a nation "without a people" (Elefantis 1992 ; also Stavrakakis 2005, 246) , oppositional forces demanded re-incorporation in an inclusionary political community envisaged along rather populist lines. The situation became more contentious in the late 1950s and early 1960s, as Greece entered a turbulent period characterized by emergent social movements, a youth uprising and civil society initiatives. Now, broad social strata started to gradually claim the expansion of social and political rights, the democratization of the political system, as well as a more progressive life-style (Nikolakopoulos 2001; Kornetis 2013) . Processes within society were soon reflected on the political level with the rise of more progressive political forces. In 1958, EDA (Unified Democratic Left) became the main opposition party (Clogg 1987, 38) , while after 1961 the Centre Union (which, despite its anti-communist character, included a progressive faction) gained momentum and soon rose to power. This was the political environment in which Andreas Papandreou took his first steps and made his presence felt for the first time (ibid., 40-49). It was also the environment in which social mobilisations indicated a "marching" of the popular masses into the political scene, something that presented a serious challenge to the regime of ethnikofrosini and the right's exclusionary monopoly to the nation. This dynamic was violently interrupted by the imposition of the Colonels' regime in 1967, but it resumed with renewed force right after the Junta fell in 1974.
Greece after the Junta: consolidating democracy, glorifying "the people" The military Junta fell in July 1974 and Greece was set on track to restore democracy. At first, the paternalistic figure of Konstantinos Karamanlis, a right-wing conservative politician, managed to secure for his newly established party, New Democracy, two undisrupted terms in power (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) . His narrative was one of stability, reconciliation and national unity, paving the way towards EEC accession, and managed to attract the majority of Greek voters (Pappas 2014, 15-16) . Karamanlis tried to overcome the deep wounds caused by the civil war and by the very regime of ethnikofrosini (in which he had played a key-role in the 1950s and 1960s as Prime Minister) by abandoning the right's passionate anti-communism, adopting more progressive socio-economic policies and trying to include all Greek citizens in his narrative, regardless of political persuasions (Lyrintzis 1984, 106) . In this effort, he often stressed that his party "identifies the people with the nation", as well as "national sovereignty with popular sovereignty", quoting the founding declaration of his newly established party (ND 1974) . As Efthimis Papavlasopoulos notes, "the nation" along with "national interest" constituted the very core of the official ideology of the conservative party, as historically expressed by Karamanlis and ND (Papavlasopoulos 2004, 5) .
Even though Karamanlis managed to restore fundamental freedoms and political rights, securing a peaceful transition to liberal democracy, there was still a big part of the population that never felt properly represented and incorporated. This is the gap that Andreas Papandreou and his party came to fill. PASOK's archetypal populism, put forward the demands of the so-called "non-privileged" for social justice, popular sovereignty and national independence against an "establishment" accused of monopolising political access and economic privilege in various ways since the end of the civil war. In this way, it effectively addressed the side that was defeated in the civil war, and thus those excluded from the national and political community in the decades that followed, promising not only their reincorporation into its ranks, but also their recognition as the "true protagonists", as "true patriots". In this context, Christos Lyrintzis has stressed that a "major achievement of the PASOK governments of the 1981-1989 period was the empowerment of social groups that had never enjoyed any significant share of power" (Lyrintzis 2005, 149) . Indeed, PASOK "adopted and implemented a 'populist mode of political incorporation', whose main goal was the incorporation into the political system of social strata excluded from it by previous right-wing governments" (Lyrintzis 1993, 30 ). Diamandouros, a strong critic of PASOK's populist legacy, also speaks about the 1974-1985 period in terms of an "incorporative moment", in which PASOK's role both in opposition and in power was crucial (Diamandouros 1993, 8, 10-12) .
But the early PASOK was not only about political incorporation, symbolic recognition and representation of the previously excluded. The party's record in power was marked by myriads of pathologies, such as rampant clientelism, corruption, economic policies based on increased borrowing, public administration practices that led to a rather "chaotic" expansion of the state, along with nationalist tendencies (Lyrintzis 1993; Diamandouros 1993) . To be sure, during the 1970s and 1980s, PASOK was a multifaceted, complex and often paradoxical phenomenon.
Within the scope of our analysis, what is crucial to revisit is what PASOK's populism "actually" did regarding the construction and representation of the Greek people. Did it play a key role in identifying the Greek people with the Greek nation in terms that one would be entitled to recognise its ideology as primarily national-populist? Was it nationalist in a more pronounced and salient way when compared to its political rivals?
In order to answer this question we need to adopt a macro-historical view and remind ourselves, once more, that a significant part of the Greek society was deprived by the post-war regime of ethnikofrosini of the very right to belong to the nation. In this sense, restoring the people as rightful co-participants within the national community seems more of an act of symbolic recognition, an act of egalitarian incorporation, 3 than the culmination of an ethno-nationalist project. This becomes even more evident if one takes a comparative look and contrasts PASOK to its political rivals of that time. In doing so, one soon realises that the main party of the right, ND, had adopted all along a discourse that strongly emphasised the party's commitment to the nation, something which was also evident in the discourse of other parties, even that of the communist left (KKE). In this sense, relating the people to the nation was hardly a distinctive characteristic that set PASOK apart from other parties; hence it cannot qualify as the defining/distinctive trait in assessing its profile. It was a populist politics of inclusion and incorporation that predominantly defined PASOK's discursive strategy during the 1970s and 1980s, something which was also crucial for its ascendance to power; and here a re-appropriation of national membership from right-wing elites obviously had a prominent, yet overdetermined, place.
At any rate, it would be equally wrong to claim that the PASOK of that period was anti-nationalist or non-nationalist. What is crucial is to recognise the context-related characteristics as well as the historical pre-conditions of possibility for the specific brand of nationalism that the early PASOK indeed expressed. One that responded to decades of Greece's dependence on foreign powers, one that reacted to the right-wing camp's long suppression of the left and progressive forces, one that was closely related to the Greek left's traditional anti-imperialism and anti-Americanism, but also to a historically-specific kind of 'decolonisation' discourse.
PASOK's populism started to fade as soon as Papandreou himself started to withdraw in the early 1990s. The party thus took a different path from the mid-1990s onwards, under the leadership of Costas Simitis, a mild-mannered technocrat and vocal opponent of populism, nationalism and clientelism, who developed a public profile close to the paradigm of the Blairite 'third way' (Lyrintzis 2005) . His sharp antipopulism, gaining prominence already by the early 1990s, meant a major transformation in PASOK's discourse, and created an environment conducive to the rise of new populist actors (see Pantazopoulos 2011, 149-185) .
The diversification of the field: Religious and extreme-right populists after 2000
Right before the dawn of the 21 st century, Greece seemed to have left behind the days of populist hegemony. Now, economic and technical issues regarding the Economic and Monetary Union dominated the agenda, with Simitis' government adopting a forward-looking narrative stressing the new strengths of the Greek economy, its privileged position at the core of the EU and the benefits that would soon accrue from its participation in the Eurozone. "Consensus" became a buzzword among most mainstream politicians, stressing the need to converge on a series of key-policy issues (Katsambekis 2016a, 151) . With mainstream parties struggling to differentiate one's programme from the other's, populist challengers soon rose from rather unexpected places.
The case of Archbishop Christodoulos is quite important here. In 2000, the Simitis government decision to delete reference to religion from Greek identity cards triggered an unprecedented response on behalf of the Church of Greece. The then newly elected Archbishop Christodoulos led a campaign to oppose this decision, articulating a discourse that was marked by a sharply populist profile. This campaign included mass rallies in the two biggest cities of Greece, Thessaloniki and Athens, attended by hundreds of thousands of people. This phase of populist mobilization ended rather abruptly in September 2001 after the Church's demand for a referendum was declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court and dismissed by the President of the Republic, Costis Stephanopoulos. At any rate, detailed discourseanalytical research has shown that the articulation of Church discourse during that period gave a prominent place to "the people", which functioned as its nodal point. In addition, it was clearly organized according to an antagonistic logic, distinguishing between "us", the forces of Good (the People as represented by the Church under God) and "them", the forces of Evil (an atheist, modernizing, intellectualist and repressive government) (Stavrakakis 2004; . To be sure, "the people" of Christodoulos were not just the orthodox Christian people, but clearly the Greek people, as he presented in his discourse a quasi-primordial link between the Greek nation, Orthodoxy and "the people of the church". In this sense, the nationalism expressed by Christodoulos was of a rather traditional kind: "Inside us there is a whole treasure, an unspent richness that has not been distorted up to now, that unites all our race [genos]" (Christodoulos, quoted in Stavrakakis 2005, 244 ).
This kind of nationalism is a constant in the Greek Church's discourse, which has often claimed historical, quasi-metaphysical links with the Greek nation (Chrysoloras 2004) . But if a deeply rooted nationalism is a core characteristic of the Greek Church's profile, the same cannot be argued with regard to populism. Before the identity cards crisis "the people" were not assigned any privileged position in archbishop Christodoulos' discourse or in that of his predecessors (Stavrakakis 2004, 260) . Likewise, more recently, important Church figures have adopted "anti-populist" positions, siding with the "Yes" in the July 2015 referendum. In other words, although nationalism is a constitutive characteristic of the hierarchy of the Church of Greece, evident from its foundation, its articulation with other themes (populist or anti-populist) is a matter of contingency, following from the various orientations that the leadership chooses from time to time (Papastahis 2009 ). The articulation of the two in Christodoulos's project seems thus more of a strategic choice than an outcome of any pre-existing necessity.
The second major nationalist-populist incident of that period came a few months after the dust had settled from Christodoulos' mobilizations and was associated with the then newly formed party: National Orthodox Rally ( No doubt, the signifier "the people" constituted a central reference in LAOS's discourse. In fact, the party's acronym, LAOS [λαός] means "the people" in Greek. Its discourse was also premised on a sharply antagonistic view of society. In this context, the relevant literature immediately categorized LAOS as a populist party belonging to the populist radical right party family (Tsiras 2012) . Crucially, "the people" of LAOS were identified with the Greek nation and with Orthodoxy (the very name of the party stressing the popular and the orthodox). A cursory glance at Karatzaferis' discourse suffices to establish that Greek "people" and "nation" are understood as inseparable; with the latter being defined in terms of historical, territorial and even racial continuity: "all of you […] constitute the core of the Nation, the heart of Greece" (Karatzaferis 2001) . As the main enemy of this Greek people-as-nation, Karatzaferis pitted the "rotten establishment" of PASOK and ND, the so-called "New world Order", but also the abstract figure of the "illegal immigrant", that "invades" Greece, occupying job positions that were intended for the natives, threatening the Greek people's security and well-being, "contaminating" the country's ancient and "pure" culture (Tsiras 2012) . In this context, LAOS' discourse was firstly built around an in/out logic, calling upon those that were considered members of the ethno-national community to act against those outside. Only secondarily did LAOS' discourse draw upon down/up logics, targeting the "establishment" which yet again was threatening those in by favouring those out (from "illegal immigrants" to "US sovereignty"). Hence, for Karatzaferis, the task of the people was to protect and guarantee the future and integrity of the nation: "Our own people guarantee the Future of the NATION.
[…] We are called upon to protect the NATION. To fight for the Homeland.
[…] The Popular Orthodox Rally does not invest on chimeras, it does not dispose sovereignty rights to foreign patrons or local dependants.
[LAOS] addresses the People and draws power from the People" (Karatzaferis 2006 ; capitals in the original). LAOS adopted a vocal office-seeking strategy right after the outbreak of the debt crisis that hit Greece in 2009-2010, claiming that it would act as a "responsible partner" within the political scene, facilitating cross-party collaboration and alliances in times crucial for the country's survival, even stressing the bonds of LAOS with ND, in the context of a right-wing "family tree" [δεξιά πολυκατοικία]. This strategy, combined with a significant transformation of the party's discourse towards a less populist logic, paid off and LAOS was soon accepted by the traditional (now antipopulist) parties, PASOK and ND, as a "responsible ally". Gradually shedding its populism, LAOS emphasized in its 2012 manifesto that it defined itself as a "genuinely patriotic", "Greek-centred" and "originally popular" party with a "movement character", stressing that it is "popular […] without being populist" (LAOS 2012, 4).
Still, LAOS maintained a strong nationalist ideology, combined with conspiracytheory elements, xenophobia and a sharp anti-left/anti-communist orientation, targeted against SYRIZA's emerging dynamic. This turn of events indicates that it is nationalism/nativism 4 that one should identify as the core ideological characteristic of LAOS, the key to understanding its physiognomy, and not its populism. This brings us back to Cas Mudde's crucial but not often recalled thesis on Europe's populist radical right: 'nativism, not populism, is the ultimate core feature of the ideology of this party family' (Mudde 2007, 26) .
The rise of the populist left and its cohabitation with the populist right in crisisridden Greece Shifting our focus to the other side of the political spectrum, one is immediately confronted with the emergence of the populist radical left within the context of the crisis that hit Greece after 2009 (Katsambekis 2016b) . SYRIZA, a coalition-turnedparty, addressed and eventually managed to mobilise "the people" with a discourse that articulated various popular demands and grievances against the Greek and European "elites" and their policies of austerity along the lines of an "Us" vs. "Them" schema (Stavrakakis & Katsambekis 2014) . Its rise to prominence established a new polarisation within the Greek political system between the pro-austerity/promemorandum political forces (represented by PASOK and ND) and the antiausterity/anti-memorandum forces (represented by SYRIZA). This polarisation was signified by political and media elites in terms of a struggle between "anti-populist rationalism" versus "irrational populism" (Stavrakakis 2014) , thus incorporating the rise of SYRIZA within the predominantly anti-populist narrative that had been hegemonic within the Greek public sphere from the mid-1990s onwards (Katsambekis 2014b, 562-565) .
SYRIZA was the only parliamentary party that engaged with the demands of the antiausterity movements and protests that made their presence felt throughout 2010-2011. The party tried to represent the marginalised and disenfranchised social strata in its discourse, constructing and performing its own version of the "crisis", attributing the blame to the old "two-party establishment" (PASOK/ND) and to the neoliberal policies imposed by the EU and IMF. Its programme aimed at a radical break with austerity and neoliberalism, stressing political renewal and democratic reinvigoration, while aiming at a radical redistribution of wealth. As shown in earlier research (Stavrakakis & Katsambekis 2014; Katsambekis 2016b ), SYRIZA's populism was of a very distinctive blend, one close to the ideal-type of left-wing populism as described by Luke March. The latter has stressed that left-wing populism "emphasizes egalitarianism and inclusivity rather than the openly exclusivist anti-immigrant or anti-foreigner concerns of right-populism" (March 2011, 122) . Indeed, SYRIZA's discourse endorsed pro-immigrant and pro-rights demands, which emphasised tolerance within a pluralist society and hence an effort to incorporate various minorities within "the people". Moreover, the party's discourse has been diachronically marked by strong anti-nationalist ideological elements, which were toned-down only as the party was approaching power and thus needed to address the national audience in more universal, 'banal nationalist' terms (as it is the case with most parties that ascend to power). In effect, SYRIZA developed its own blend of "anti-colonial" patriotism as it was approaching power, often stressing the "pride" and "dignity" of the impoverished Greek people, as opposed to oppressing power-elites within and outside the debt-ridden country.
In January 2015, SYRIZA won a general election and formed a coalition government with ANEL, a nationalist-populist party that built its strategy on a strong anti-austerity discourse. ANEL's ideological roots can be found in what in Greece is called the "popular right", which was traditionally part of ND and had articulated in its discourse elements of Keynesianism and state-interventionism, along with nationalism and a commitment to religion. ANEL were created by a former MP of ND, Panos Kammenos, in 2012, and they achieved impressive results in the elections of May and June 2012, running on an anti-austerity ticket, while attacking the "troika" and its party collaborators in Greece (ND/PASOK), which they depicted as "traitors" or even "conspirators" against the homeland. In this sense ANEL can be safely identified as a right-wing nationalist party, with their discourse sometimes containing xenophobic, racist and conspiracy-mongering elements.
SYRIZA's co-existence with ANEL has been uneasy, but remarkably stable. The two parties seem to agree on the management of state finances and public administration, while occasionally disagreeing on issues that have to do with immigration, the rights agenda, religion and culture. What seems to have brought the two parties together was their common anti-memorandum and anti-austerity position, as well as their populism: a dichotomic political perspective pitting "the people" against the "elites" (local and global). Otherwise, the two parties have preserved their sharply distinctive characters, made evident in their public discourses but also in concrete policy choices. They thus provide a crucial example of how populism can operate as a formal orientation allowing different ideological articulations. Crucially, these articulations can range from nativism and nationalism (in the case of ANEL) to positions negotiating tolerance within an inclusionary and multicultural society (in the case of SYRIZA).
Overall, their differentiations and divergences have come about on issues of ideological disagreement on the left/right or progressive/conservative axis. First, SYRIZA proposed a law in June 2015 to grant full citizenship rights to the majority of second generation immigrants and especially immigrant children. The bill was voted down by ANEL, but passed with the support of parties of the liberal centre and the centre-left, Potami and PASOK. The same happened with the new legal framework concerning same-sex civil unions passed by the Greek Parliament in December 2015: once more, the law was voted down by ANEL and passed with votes from Potami, PASOK and Union of Centrists. The distance was reaffirmed with regard to the building of a Mosque in central Athens as well as on other occasions. These paradigmatic instances show that while there are crucial strategic and programmatic elements that hold the two parties together in a power-sharing arrangement, they remain far apart in terms of ideology and especially regarding the conception of the nation and that of a tolerant and pluralist society. Accordingly, their populisms develop along different patterns.
The sharp ideological differences among them are evident not only on the discursive level and on aspects of their policy agenda, but have also been measured in quantitative terms, on the level of attitudes. A recent study (Stavrakakis, Andreadis & Katsambekis 2016 ) has used a reformulated populism index to conduct a candidate survey in order to identify populist parties in Greece. Findings have shown that ANEL and SYRIZA are clearly distinguished from other non-populist or anti-populist parties (PASOK, ND and Potami) . Yet, what this study further established was the clear ideological division within the populist camp itself, between ANEL and SYRIZA, illustrating that one can observe crucially different attitudes between the two parties along the Green-Alternative-Libertarian / Traditional-AuthoritarianNationalist (GAL/TAN) dimension (Hooghe, Marks, & Wilson, 2002) . The scores of SYRIZA and ANEL candidates on the GAL vs. TAN index were 1.9 and 3.4 respectively, providing additional support to the hypothesis that right-wing populism is exclusionary and identity-focused, while left-wing populism is more inclusionary and pluralist" (Stavrakakis, Andreadis & Katsambekis 2016, 12-13) . These differences become even more apparent when we focus on specific issues, like immigration. In this case, we find SYRIZA candidates on the one side of the spectrum, showing the most tolerant and pro-immigration stance among Greek political parties, while ANEL candidates occupy the exact opposite position. 5 Crucially, the "degrees" of nationalism as measured in candidates' responses perfectly follow the positioning of each party on the left-right axis, illustrating that there is no automatic relationship between populist and nationalist attitudes in this particular case.
The latest development within (and beyond) Greece's populist politics concerns a transnational initiative that still seems to be in the making: Yanis Varoufakis' DiEM25. DiEM25 came into being after Varoufakis left SYRIZA following the July 2015 referendum, after SYRIZA's populist strategy to counter neoliberal austerity reached a crucial limit. Given that Varoufakis had been a very active figure during SYRIZA's first term in office, we feel intrigued to ask: could it be that the failure to have a successful (progressive) populism in government, in one country, led to the endeavour for a pan-European transnational populist movement? If that is the case, then with Varoufakis' initiative a circle seems to be closing. Greece's post-war political scene was defined by a paradoxical distancing between "nation" and "people", by the opposition between ethnikofrosini (national-mindedness) and laocratia (people-power); today this distancing may be re-emerging to the extent that people like Varoufakis come to the conclusion that a defence of popular interests can be effectively pursued only if social/political action at the national level is closely articulated with a transnational project, thus taking populism beyond the national level in a more pronounced way (see Panayotou 2017) .
Conclusion
Populism is a truly ambiguous phenomenon, able to manifest within extremely different ideological and socio-political contexts. In this sense, one should be very careful when formulating reductive definitions or when putting forward normative assumptions. The historico-conceptual and comparative exercise that we attempted here was premised on the intension to highlight the contradictions that may occur when adopting reductionist and/or essentialist approaches regarding populist politics. Such approaches often seem to ignore the historicity and inherent plasticity of the phenomenon in its global scale, reducing, for example, populism to nationalism (Pantazopoulos 2013; , in a manner that returns us way back to the definitional "procrustean dilemma" that was discussed in the famous LSE conference on populism of the late-1960s (Ionescu & Gellner 1969) .
Obviously, an Essex School stress on discursive articulation predisposes us to inquire on the structural location of populist signifiers within a particular discourse: for example, where is reference to "the people" located within a given discourse: does it function as the nodal point, as a central empty signifier? Or is it located at the periphery of the discursive structure under examination, relegated to a mere moment in a wider discursive articulation? Moreover, and crucially for our endeavour here, the discursive perspective urges us to research the historical preconditions of every articulation within a given context, highlighting the distinctiveness of every project; in other words, highlighting the historically-specific and context-related features of the various populist experiences.
On these premises we set out to problematize the relationship between populism and nationalism, and thus between the signifiers "people" and "nation", in the context of the Greek case. We began with the paradoxical juxtaposition between "nation" and "people" established during the post-War era by the ruling right-wing camp, stressing the implications of a regime that excluded from the national community a significant part of the population. We proceeded with an analysis of the populist discourse of the early PASOK in the 1970s and 1980s, within which the "nation" was reclaimed by the left, with populism overdetermining its meaning. We then focused on sharply different and contradicting cases of populist mobilisation within contemporary Greece, in a context defined by the anti-populist and "technocratic" turn of PASOK under Simitis, examining religious and extreme-right populism, as exemplified in the cases of Archbishop Christodoulos and LAOS. Moving on with our "genealogy", we highlighted the distinctive ideological traits of SYRIZA's inclusionary populism and the party's uneasy symbiosis with the national-populist ANEL.
What can we make out of this extreme variability of the nationalism/populism nexus within the context of a small country like Greece? In an effort to theorise our empirical findings, two options seem to open themselves: the relationship between nationalism and populism can either be one of contingent articulation or one of a necessary, reductive fusion. Yet, only the first orientation can effectively account for the paradoxes of historical experience. Here, as we tried to show, Greece presents a hugely significant case, due to the vast multiplicity of antithetical articulations between populism and nationalism within a (historically speaking) rather short period of time. While stressing how strongly populism operates in tandem with nationalism, our analysis has highlighted the extremely different forms this mutual engagement can take, with each instance requiring careful treatment within a rigorous theoretical framework that can accommodate and critically interpret such heterogeneities.
The observed differences in the articulation of populism with nationalism have important consequences. It is possible to have country-wide divisions along a "nation vs. the people" axis as post-war Greece demonstrates; a distancing re-emerging in a very different strategic form with Varoufakis' DiEM25. In some cases, a specific notion of "the people" within a nationalist discursive framework foregrounds the emergence of a populist strategy (as is the case, for example, with Christodoulos), while in others "the nation" very gradually enters the repertoire of a populist discourse due to the political and historical context, without crucially influencing the priorities of a given populist discourse (as has been the case with SYRIZA). Indeed, recent history along with the current conjuncture also provide many instances in which political antagonism leads to the ideological articulation of "people" and "nation" in opposite camps or radically transforms their meaning. Here, international examples would include the Socialist Party's inclusionary populism against Geert Wilders' exclusionary nativist-populism in the Netherlands or the pluralist and tolerant "people" of Bernie Sanders against the homogeneous and intolerant "nation" of Donald Trump. In that sense, and although the relations between nationalism and populism do call for further exploration, our thesis is that, in both theoretical and historical terms, the relation between the nation and the people is context-dependent and historically-specific, and does not obey any predetermined reductionist or essentialist logic of fusion.
At any rate, further research is definitely needed if the relation between populism and nationalism is to be adequately theorised and clarified. This research should take into account various historical conjunctures in which the "people" and the "nation" represented separated or even opposite camps, while it should also inquire into the variations of the close articulation between the two in different geographical and socio-political contexts. The empirical and comparative part of our paper, focusing on the Greek experience, is moving exactly in this direction, positioning Greek populism firmly within its historicity and variability, offering some preliminary conclusions that could be tested in further comparative research. If the relation between the two modes of identification tends to vary so much within a given national context within a timespan of five decades, one can only imagine the variability and contradictions that comparativists will encounter when engaging with research on a global scale.
